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Abstract
Experimentally elicited discount rates are frequently higher than what one would infer
from market interest rates and seem unreasonable for economic decision-making. Such
high rates have often been attributed to dynamic inconsistency, as in present bias and
hyperbolic discounting. A commonly recognized bias of standard elicitation techniques
is the use of linear preferences for identication. We present a novel methodology for
identifying time preferences, both discounting and utility function curvature, from simple
allocation decisions. We estimate annual discount rates substantially lower than normally
obtained, and limited though signicant utility function curvature. Additionally, our data
show no evidence of dynamic inconsistency.
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Intertemporal allocation of resources is a central theme in many aggregate and individual
models of decision making. Consumers decide how much to save for the future, how much
education to obtain, how much to exercise, diet, and smoke. Understanding and estimating
time preferences is obviously of great importance to economists and policy makers. While there
has been substantial research estimating time preferences using aggregate consumption data1,
the bulk of the eort has occurred in laboratory environments.2 Among the many laboratory
techniques employed, many recent studies have favored multiple price lists (MPL) with real
payments.3
With MPLs, individuals are asked multiple times to choose between smaller payment
amounts closer to the present and larger amounts further into the future. The interest rate
increases monotonically in a price list, such that the point where an individual switches from
preferring sooner payments to later payments carries information on their intertemporal prefer-
ences. Under time-separable stationary preferences and linear utility, individual discount rates
can be bounded and potentially calculated from MPL switching points.4
A notable feature of MPLs (and other experimental methods) is that they yield remarkably
high average discount rates. Estimates of annual discount rates over one hundred percent are
common (Frederick et al., 2002). This is curiously at odds with aggregate models of discounting
which imply much lower annual discount rates (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002; Cagetti, 2003;
1Examples include Hausman (1979); Gourinchas and Parker (2002); Cagetti (2003); Laibson, Repetto and
Tobacman (2003, 2005).
2For a survey of the experimental literature, see Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2002). Recent
contributions include Harrison, Lau and Williams (2002); Harrison, Lau, Rutstrom and Williams (2005); Ander-
sen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2008); Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter (2007); Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen
(2009).
3The MPL with real payments in economics was motivated and popularized by Coller and Williams (1999)
and Harrison et al. (2002). In psychology, a similar technique was employed by Kirby, Petry and Bickel (1999)
and has been implemented in several economic laboratory experiments (see Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt
and Taubinsky, 2008a,b).
4Price list switching points indicate approximately where sooner and later payments are equally valued. Take
a sooner payment, ct a later payment ct+k, and a utility function U(ct;ct+k). Under time-separable stationary
utility, U(ct;ct+k) = u(ct)+ku(ct+k) and a switching point within a price list indicates where u(ct)  ku(ct+k).
Under linear utility, u(ct) = ct and  is calculated as   (ct=ct+k)1=k. Discount rates are then calculated as
IDR = 1=   1.
1Laibson et al., 2003). A possible reconciliation of experimental and aggregate estimates may
lie in the assumption of linear utility. This frequently imposed restriction leads to upwards-
biased discount rate estimates if utility is concave.5 Andersen et al. (2008) suggest the solution
of separately administering MPLs and price list risk preference measures based on Holt and
Laury (2002) (HL) to the same subjects, and jointly estimating discounting and curvature
parameters combining the two measures.6 Tanaka et al. (2009) employ a similar approach with
a risk price list task designed to elicit loss aversion. We term this the Double Multiple Price
List (DMPL) approach.
We propose a single, simple instrument that can capture both discounting and concavity
of utility in the same measure. Notice that the binary choice of an MPL task is akin to
intertemporal optimization subject to a discontinuous budget. The potentially problematic
discontinuity suggests a simple solution: convexify the experimental budgets.
This paper explores the implications of performing this convexication to obtain the Convex
Time Budget (CTB). Intertemporal allocations in CTBs are solutions to standard intertempo-
ral constrained optimization problems. Analysis of the allocations is straightforward. Given a
set of functional form assumptions about discounting and curvature of the utility function, pref-
erence parameters are estimable at either the group or individual level. Additionally, structural
assumptions such as the dynamic consistency of time preferences can be tested.
In a computerized experiment with 97 subjects, we show that the CTB methodology can
be used to generate precise estimates of discounting and curvature parameters at both the
group and individual level. These estimates require a minimal set of structural assumptions
5Under linear utility, u(ct) = ct and  is calculated as L  (ct=ct+k)1=k. Rabin (2000) shows that under
expected utility theory, individuals should have approximately linear preferences for small stakes outcomes,
such as those normally used in time preference experiments. However, a variety of studies show substantial
curvature over small stakes outcomes (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002). If there is curvature to the utility function
C  (u(ct)=u(ct+k))1=k. The direction of the bias C   L depends on the shape of the utility function.
Concavity generates downwards-biased discount factor (upwards-biased discount rate) estimates.
6Frederick et al. (2002) propose a similar strategy of separately identifying the utility function and dis-
counting along with two other approaches for distinguishing time preferences from curvature: 1) eliciting utility
judgements such as attractiveness ratings at two points in time; and 2) eliciting preferences over temporally
separated probabilistic prospects to exploit the linearity-in-probability property of expected utility. The second
approach is employed by Anderhub, Guth, Gneezy and Sonsino (2001).
2and are easily implemented econometrically. On average, estimates of individual discount rates
are found to be considerably lower than in previous studies. Across specications, we estimate
average annual discount rates between 20 and 35 percent. We reject linearity of utility, although
we nd much less curvature than prior studies. Finally, to our surprise, we nd no evidence of
present-bias or hyperbolic discounting in our sample.
We also compare within-subjects results of the computerized CTB and those obtained using
a standard paper-and-pencil DMPL. Our design allows us to make individual level comparisons.
Interestingly, though individual discounting correlates highly across elicitation mechanisms, es-
timated curvature from CTBs is found to be independent of DMPL risk experimental responses.
Our results leave open several avenues for future research. First, why did we nd no evidence
of present bias or hyperbolic discounting? One hypothesis is that this may be the result of
some unique measures we took to equate transaction costs of sooner and later payments and to
increase condence of receiving future payments. This interpretation suggests that some of the
behavior attributed to present bias in the literature may actually be an artifact of dierential
transactions costs over sooner and later payments. Second, we nd substantial dierences
between our CTB results and those obtained from prior DMPL experiments. It is important to
know whether these dierences are associated with presentation dierences (computer interface
vs. paper-and-pencil) or if the nding is robust to similar presentations of the stimuli. Third, we
nd little correlation between CTB estimated curvature and responses in HL risk experiments.
This may suggest a real dierence between the utility parameters that apply in intertemporal
and probabilistic settings.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains the motivation of the CTB and design for
the CTB experiment. Section 3 outlines our econometric specication while Section 4 presents
results at the group level and individual level. Section 5 provides a brief discussion of arbitrage
opportunities in monetary experiments and Section 6 concludes.
32 Experimental Design: Convex Time Budgets
In each decision of an MPL, subjects choose either an amount ct, available at time t, or an
amount ct+k > ct, available after a delay of k > 0 periods. Let (1+r) be the experimental gross
interest rate and m be the experimental budget.7 Assuming some utility function, U(ct;ct+k),
the MPL task asks subjects to maximize utility subject to the discrete budget set:
((1 + r)ct;ct+k) 2 f(m;0);(0;m)g: (1)
Assuming linear utility, the corner solution constraints implied by (1) are non-binding. However,
if the utility function is concave, the constraints bind and one cannot infer a discounting measure
from MPL switching points.
Imagine, instead of (1), we allow subjects to choose ct and ct+k continuously along a convex
budget set:
(1 + r)ct + ct+k = m: (2)
This is simply a standard future value budget constraint. To operationalize (2) we provide
subjects with a budget of experiment `tokens.' Tokens can be allocated to either a sooner time,
t, or a later time, t + k, at dierent `token exchange rates.' The relative rate at which tokens
translate into actual payments determines the gross interest rate, (1+r). Subjects choose how
many tokens to allocate to sooner and later periods. We will refer to this method of eliciting
preferences as the Convex Time Budget (CTB) approach.
Substantial information on intertemporal preferences can be obtained from allocations in
this convex choice environment. Variations to delay lengths, k, and interest rates, (1+r), allow
7Theoretically extra-experimental interest rates and liquidity constraints should inuence laboratory deci-
sions (Coller and Williams, 1999). If subjects can borrow (save) at rates inferior (superior) to the laboratory
oered interest rates then they have an arbitrage opportunity. If subjects are credit constrained, they may
choose sooner experimental payments to smooth consumption. In a controlled experiment with MPLs, Coller
and Williams (1999) show that providing external interest rate information and elaborating possible arbitrage
strategies makes treated subjects appear only slightly more patient. Meier and Sprenger (2010) show that ob-
jectively measured credit constraints taken from individual credit reports are generally uncorrelated with MPL
responses. For further discussion on arbitrage opportunities and liquidity constraints see Section 5.
4for the identication of time discounting and utility function curvature. Variations to starting
times, t, allow for the identication of present bias and hyperbolic discounting.
2.1 CTB Design Features
Our experiment was conducted at the University of California, San Diego in January of 2009.
Subjects made decisions on 45 convex budgets. These 45 budgets involve 9 combinations of
starting times, t, and delay lengths, k, and have annual interest rates that vary from zero to
over 1000% per year.
t and k: A (3  3) design was implemented with three sooner payment dates, t = (0;7;35)
days from the experiment date, crossed with three delay lengths, (k = 35;70;98) days.8 Thus
there are nine (t;k) cells and within each cell are 5 CTB questions, generating 45 choices for
each subject. We term each (t;k) combination a `choice set'. The choice of t and k combinations
was determined by the academic calendar. Payment dates were set to avoid holidays (including
Valentine's Day), school vacations, spring break and nal examination weeks. Payments were
scheduled to arrive on the same day of the week (t and k are both multiples of 7), to avoid
dierential week-day eects.
Tokens and Interest Rates: In each CTB question, subjects were given a budget of 100
tokens. Tokens allocated to sooner payments had a value of at while tokens allocated to later
payments had a value of at+k. In most cases, at+k was $.20 per token and at varied from
$.20 to $.10 per token.9 Note that at+k=at = 1 + r, the gross interest rate over k days, and
(1 + r)1=k gives the standardized daily interest rate. Daily net interest rates in the experiment
varied considerably across the 45 budgets, from 0 to around 1 percent per day implying annual
interest rates of between 0 and 1300 percent (compounded quarterly).
Each choice set featured at+k = $0:20 and at = $0:16 (1 + r = 1:25). In eight of the nine
8See below for the recruitment and payment eorts that allowed sooner payments, including those for t = 0,
to be implemented in the same manner as later payments.
9In eight of 45 choices, at+k was $.25. If an individual allocated all her tokens in every choice to the later
payment, she could expect to earn either $20 or $25. If she allocated all her tokens to the sooner payment in
every choice, she would earn at least $10.
5choice sets, one convex budget represented a pure income shift relative to this choice. This
was implemented with at+k = $0:25 and at = $0:20 (1 + r = 1:25 again). In the remaining
choice set, (t;k) = (7;70), we instead implemented at = $:20 and at+k = $:20, a zero percent
interest rate. Table 1 shows the token rates, interest rates, standardized daily interest rates
and corresponding annual interest rates for all 45 budgets.
2.2 Implementation and Protocol
One of the most challenging aspects of implementing any time discounting study is making all
choices equivalent except for their timing. That is, transactions costs associated with receiving
payments, including physical costs and condence, must be equalized across all time periods.
We took several unique steps in our subject recruitment process and our payment procedure in
order to more closely equate transaction costs over time.
2.2.1 Recruitment
In order to participate in the experiment, subjects were required to live on campus. All campus
residents are provided with an individual mailbox at their dormitory. Students frequently use
these mailboxes as all postal service mail and intra-campus mail are received at this mailbox.
Each mailbox is locked and individuals have keyed access 24 hours per day.
By special arrangement with the university mail services oce, we were granted same-
day access to a specic subset of campus mailboxes. These mailboxes were located at staed
dormitory mail centers and so experimental payments could be immediately placed in a subject's
locked mailbox. As such, subjects in our experiment were required to have one of the xed
number of campus mailboxes to which we had immediate access. We recruited 97 undergraduate
freshman and sophomores meeting these criteria.
6Table 1: Choice Sets
t (start date) k (delay) Token Budget at at+k (1 + r) Daily Rate (%) Annual Rate (%)
0 35 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.147 65.3
0 35 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.301 164.4
0 35 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.64 528.9
0 35 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 1.024 1300.9
0 35 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.64 528.9
0 70 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.073 29.6
0 70 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.151 67.4
0 70 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.319 178.1
0 70 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 0.511 362.1
0 70 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.319 178.1
0 98 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.052 20.5
0 98 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.228 113
0 98 100 0.13 0.2 1.54 0.441 286.4
0 98 100 0.1 0.2 2 0.71 637.1
0 98 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.228 113
7 35 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.147 65.3
7 35 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.301 164.4
7 35 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.64 528.9
7 35 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 1.024 1300.9
7 35 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.64 528.9
7 70 100 0.2 0.2 1 0 0
7 70 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.073 29.6
7 70 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.151 67.4
7 70 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.319 178.1
7 70 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 0.511 362.1
7 98 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.052 20.5
7 98 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.228 113
7 98 100 0.13 0.2 1.54 0.441 286.4
7 98 100 0.1 0.2 2 0.71 637.1
7 98 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.228 113
35 35 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.147 65.3
35 35 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.301 164.4
35 35 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.64 528.9
35 35 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 1.024 1300.9
35 35 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.64 528.9
35 70 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.073 29.6
35 70 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.151 67.4
35 70 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.319 178.1
35 70 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 0.511 362.1
35 70 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.319 178.1
35 98 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.052 20.5
35 98 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.228 113
35 98 100 0.13 0.2 1.54 0.441 286.4
35 98 100 0.1 0.2 2 0.71 637.1
35 98 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.228 113
72.2.2 Experimental Payments
We employed six measures intended to equalize the costs of receiving payments. These mea-
sures not only serve to equate transactions costs over sooner and later payments, but also to
increase condence that future payments would arrive. First, all sooner and later payments,
including payments for t = 0, were placed in subjects' campus mailboxes. Subjects were fully
informed of the method of payment and the special arrangement made with university mail
services.10 Eliminating payments in the lab ensures that subjects do not disproportionately
prefer present in-lab payments because they are somehow more likely to be paid than future
extra-lab payments.
Second, upon beginning the experiment, subjects were told that they would receive a $10
thank-you payment for participating. This $10 was to be received in two payments: $5 sooner
and $5 later. All experimental earnings were added to these $5 thank-you payments, such that
subjects would receive at least $5 sooner and at least $5 later, regardless of their choices.
Third, two blank envelopes were provided to each subject. After receiving directions about
the two thank-you payments, subjects were asked to address the envelopes to themselves at
their campus mailbox, thus minimizing clerical errors on our part.
Fourth, at the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to write their payment amounts
and dates on the inside ap of both envelopes, so they would see the amounts written in their
own handwriting when payments arrived.
Fifth, one choice for each subject was chosen for payment by drawing a numbered card
at random. All experimental payments were made by personal check from Professor James
Andreoni drawn on an account at the university credit union.11 Individuals were informed that
they could cash their checks (if they so desired) at the university credit union.
Sixth, subjects were given the business card of Professor James Andreoni and told to call
10See Appendix Section A.1 for the information provided to subjects.
11Payment choice was guided by a separate survey of N = 249 undergraduate economics students eliciting
payment preferences. Personal checks from Professor Andreoni, Amazon.com gift cards, PayPal transfers and
the university stored value system TritonCash were each compared to cash payments. Subjects were asked if
they would prefer a twenty dollar payment made via each payment method or $X cash, where X was varied
from 19 to 10. Personal check payments were found to have the highest cash equivalent value.
8or email him if a payment did not arrive and that a payment would be hand-delivered immedi-
ately. This invitation to inconvenience a professor was intended to boost condence in future
payments.
We believe that these eorts helped not only to equate transactions costs across payments,
but also to engender trust between subject and experimenter. In an auxiliary survey, sub-
jects were asked if they trusted that they would receive their experimental payments. 97% of
respondents replied yes.
2.2.3 Protocol
A JavaTM-based client/server system was written to implement the CTB experiment. The
server program sent budget information, recorded subject choices and reported experiment
earnings. The client program provided instructions to subjects, elicited subject choices, and
administered a post-experiment questionnaire.
Upon starting the experiment, subjects read through directions and CTB examples. The
directions were read aloud and projected on a screen. In the CTB experiment, subjects' decision
screens displayed a dynamic calendar and a series of nine \decision tabs." These decision tabs
corresponded to the nine CTBs described above, one decision tab for each (t;k) combination.
Subjects could respond to the decision tabs in any order they wished. Each decision tab had ve
budget decisions presented in order of increasing interest rate and then in order of increasing
budget.12 An image of the subjects' decision screen is presented in Figure 1.
12For a disussion of order eects and a defense of presenting choices in order of increasing interest rate, see





























10For each decision, individuals were told how many tokens they were to allocate (always
100), the sooner token value, at, and the later token value, at+k.13 As each budget decision
was being made, the calendar in the subjects' screen would highlight the experiment date (in
yellow), the sooner date t (in green), and the later date t + k (in blue). This allowed subjects
to visualize the delay length for a given decision.14
2.2.4 Background Consumption and DMPL
At the end of the computer-based CTB experiment, subjects were administered an auxiliary
questionnaire. Importantly, subjects were asked how much they usually spend in a normal
week. The average response was $49.32 per week or $7.05 per day. This gure is used later in
our analysis (see Section 4.1.2).
In addition to the CTB experiment, we implemented a series of three MPLs and two HL risk
price list tasks (the components of the DMPL). The MPLs featured the (t;k) combinations:
(t = 0;k = 35);(t = 0;k = 98);(t = 35;k = 35). The HL risk price lists were designed to
elicit curvature over $20 and $25, respectively.15 The results of these additional measures are
analyzed in Section 4.2.1.
3 Parameter Estimation with the CTB
Given assumptions on the functional form of utility and the nature of discounting, the CTB
provides a natural context in which to jointly estimate (and test hypotheses of) time prefer-
ences and curvature of the utility function. Following convention, we posit a time separable,
13Individuals were not told the gross interest rate, (1+r). However, in a companion questionnaire individuals
were asked several numeracy questions, including one on compound interest. Roughly 70% or respondents were
able to correctly answer a standard compound interest question. The level of numeracy in the sample suggests
that the majority would be able to calculate at least the interest rate over the delay, k.
14Because t and k were multiples of 7, all dates were described by the number of weeks (e.g., t = 7;k = 35
was described as \1 week from today" and \5 weeks later").
15The MPLs and HLs could also be chosen at random for payment. For directions and the price list tasks see
Appendix Section A.2.
11exponentially discounted CRRA utility function,




where ct and ct+k are experimental earnings,  is a curvature parameter and  is a one period
discount factor. !1 and !2 are additional utility parameters which could be interpreted as
classic Stone-Geary minima.16
Maximizing (3) subject to the future value budget (2) yields the intertemporal formulation
of a Stone-Geary linear demand for ct:
ct = [
1






1 + (1 + r)(k(1 + r))
( 1
 1)](m   !2):
Notice the parameters (;) and the data (r;k) enter into the demand function in a non-linear
fashion.17 For simplicity, rewrite this demand function as
ct = g(m;r;k;;;!1;!2): (4)
In the following section we discuss estimation of the parameters ;, !1 and !2.
3.1 Estimation of Intertemporal Preferences
Let there be N experimental subjects and P CTB budgets. Assume that each subject j makes
her ctij, i = 1;2;:::;P, decisions according to (4) but that these decisions are made with some
mean-zero, potentially correlated error. That is,
ctij = g(m;r;k;;;!1;!2) + eij:
16Similar utility parameters are used in Andersen et al. (2008). In their construction experimental earnings are
added to background consumption, B, and utility does not have a Stone-Geary interpretation. For comparison
to these results, one should set !1 = !2 =  B. The parameter, B, is not estimated in their specication, but
set to 118 Danish Kroner, the average value of daily consumption in Denmark in 2003, around $25 US in 2009.
17In a Stone-Geary expenditure system, demands are linear in m;!1, and !2.
12Stacking the P observations for individual j, we have
ctj = g(m;r;k;;;!1;!2) + ej:
The vector ej is zero in expectation with variance covariance matrix Vj, a (P  P) matrix,
allowing for arbitrary correlation in the errors eij. We stack over the N experimental subjects
to obtain
ct = g(m;r;k;;;!1;!2) + e:
We assume that the terms eij may be correlated within individuals but that the errors are
uncorrelated across individuals, E(e0
jek) = 0 for j 6= k. And so e is zero in expectation with
covariance matrix 
, a block diagonal (NPNP) matrix of clusters, with individual covariance
matrices, Vj.








and minimize S() using non-linear least squares with standard errors clustered on the individual
level to obtain ^ , ^ , ^ !1 and ^ !2.18 Additionally, an estimate of the annual discount rate can be
calculated as (1=^ )365   1 with standard error obtained via the delta method. ^ 
 is estimated
as the individual-level clustered error covariance matrix. Provided additional assumptions on
the individual covariance matrix Vj, individual parameter estimates can also be obtained (see
Section 4.2).
18NLS procedures permitting the estimation of preference parameters at the aggregate or individual level are
implemented in many standard econometrics packages (e.g., Stata) and the single line of NLS code is available
from the authors.
134 Experimental Results
The results are presented in two sections. To begin, we present aggregate CTB data and provide
estimates of aggregate discounting and curvature along with tests of hyperbolic discounting.
In a second step, we explore individual level results, estimating preference parameters and
comparing the results within-subject to parameters obtained from DMPL methodology.
4.1 Aggregate Results
We identify experimental allocations as solutions to standard intertemporal optimization prob-
lems. These solutions are functions of our parameters of interest (discounting and curvature),
and experimentally varied parameters (interest rates and delay lengths). Our experimental
results should mirror this functional relationship. In Figure 2 we plot the mean number of
chosen earlier tokens against the gross interest rate, (1 + r), of each CTB decision. We plot
separate points for the three experimental values of t (t = 0, 7, 35 days), and separate graphs
for the three experimental values of k (k = 35, 70, 98 days).
At each delay length, the number of tokens allocated to the earlier payment declines mono-
tonically with the interest rate; and at comparable gross interest rates, the number of tokens
allocated earlier increases with delay length. Surprisingly, Figure 2 reveals no evidence of
present bias or hyperbolic discounting. Evidence for these phenomena would be observed as
the mean level of tokens allocated earlier being substantially higher when t = 0 compared to
t = 7 or 35. Instead, we observe that the mean number of earlier tokens at each interest rate
is roughly constant across t.
Figure 2 provides critical support for our solution function estimation strategy as aggregate
choices respond to both changing interest rates and delay lengths. Figure 2 also provides
support for estimating dynamically consistent preferences as no initial indications of aggregate
present bias or hyperbolic discounting are observed.19
19Additionally, there is support for estimating the homothetic (CRRA) utility function motivated in Section




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































154.1.1 Estimating Aggregate Preferences
Table 2 presents estimates of aggregate preference parameters. To begin, we assume a standard
exponential discount factor, , a single curvature parameter, , and background parameters,
!1 and !2. In column (1) of Table 2, the annual discount rate, utility function curvature
and background parameters, ^ !1 and ^ !2, are estimated by non-linear least squares using the
criterion function stated in (5) with clustered standard errors.
Table 2: Discounting and Curvature Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Annual Discount Rate 0.298 0.367 0.359 0.207
(0.063) (0.088) (0.093) (0.127)
Curvature Parameter: ^  0.921 0.922 0.897 0.710





^ !1 = ^ !2 1.356 0 -7.046
(0.279) - -
R-Squared 0.4909 0.4907 0.4870 0.4487
Root MSE 6.11 6.11 6.13 6.35
N 4365 4365 4365 4365
Clusters 97 97 97 97
Notes: NLS Solution Function Estimators. Column (1): Unrestricted
regression. Column (2): Regression with restriction !1 = !2. Column
(3): Regression with restriction !1 = !2 = 0. Column (4) Regression
with restriction !1 = !2 =  7:046 (the negative of average reported
daily spending). Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Annual dis-
count rate calculated as (1=^ )365  1, standard errors calculated via the
delta method.
We identify two main results. First, the aggregate annual discount rate is estimated at
0.298 (s.e. 0.063). This discount rate is substantially lower than those estimated by most other
researchers, excepting most prominently Anderson, et al
We identify two main results. First, the aggregate annual discount rate is estimated at
160.298 (s.e. 0.063). This discount rate is substantially lower than those estimated by most other
researchers, excepting most prominently Andersen et al. (2008). Second, aggregate curvature
is precisely estimated at ^  = 0:921 (s.e. = 0.006). The curvature parameter is found to be
signicantly dierent from 1 (F1;96 = 155:17; p < :01), but far closer to linear utility than
estimated from the DMPL approach employing HL risk measures. For comparison, using
DMPL methodology with a representative sample of Danish consumers, Andersen et al. (2008)
nd a coecient of relative risk aversion of 0.741, implying a curvature parameter of 0.259.
When allowing for this level of curvature and setting !1 = !2 equal to minus average daily
spending in Denmark, Andersen et al. (2008) nd a discount rate of 0.101. When assuming
linear utility, they obtain a discount rate of 0.251.
In column (1) of Table 2, we report estimates of both background parameters ^ !1 and ^ !2.
The values are positive, but low; and the hypothesis that !1 = !2 is not rejected (F1;96 =
0:56; p = 0:46). In column (2) we report estimates of an identical NLS procedure with the
restriction that !1 = !2 and obtain very similar results. The estimated discount rate is lower
than most previous experimental studies and estimated curvature is closer to linear than that
estimated from the DMPL approach.
4.1.2 The Eect of Background Consumption
Background consumption parameters pose an important challenge for experimental studies of
time preferences. While experimenters are able to vary experimental payments, subjects make
choices over consumption streams including both experimental payments and non-experimental
consumption. It is generally assumed that individuals do not adjust their non-experimental con-
sumption. That is, !1 and !2 are taken as non-estimated, xed parameters. Prior research has
either set these parameters to zero or equal to negative the average value of daily consumption
(Andersen et al., 2008).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 examine whether our results are inuenced by such simpli-
cations. We estimate non-linear least squares regressions identical to column (2) and impose
17varying restrictions on the value of background consumption. In column (3) of Table 2, the
imposed restriction is !1 = !2 = 0. In column (4) of Table 2 we restrict !1 = !2 =  7:05,
which is minus the average daily value of self-reported spending obtained from an auxiliary
survey of our subjects.
Estimated preference parameters are found to be sensitive to the choice of background
parameters. Both the estimated discount rate and ^  decrease appreciably as the restricted
value of the background parameter moves from 0 to minus the average daily consumption.
To better understand the degree to which estimated parameters are inuenced by the choice
of background parameter values, we additionally estimate with !1 and !2 equal to minus half
the average daily spending and minus twice the average daily spending. When !1 = !2 =  3:52
the estimated annual discount rate is 0.287 and curvature is 0.812. When !1 = !2 =  14:09
the estimated annual discount rate is 0.127 and curvature is 0.517. Estimated patience and
curvature are notably sensitive to changes in chosen background parameters.20
These results suggest that the choice of background parameters is potentially of great im-
portance.21 Our methodology and estimation strategy allow not only for imposing dierent
restrictions on background parameters, but also for estimating them. Thus, dierent levels of
background parameters can be compared to an estimated baseline both in terms of resulting
preference estimates and goodness of t.
4.1.3 Hyperbolic Discounting and Present Bias
Time discount functions are frequently argued to follow a hyperbolic or present-biased pattern
(Thaler, 1981; Laibson, 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Individuals are suggested to be
impatient in the present, but relatively patient in the future. Such dynamic inconsistency is
argued to at least partially account for the high average discount rates obtained in experimental
20In Appendix Table A1, we demonstrate the eect of changing the values of !1 and !2 on estimated preference
parameters and goodness of t. The results indicate substantial sensitivity of estimated parameters (particularly
curvature) to increasingly negative values of !1 and !2. Corresponding R2 values diminish accordingly.
21Andersen et al. (2008) do some sensitivity analysis and show that estimated risk preferences do vary with
background consumption, though discount rates in their estimation strategy are less sensitive.
18studies (Frederick et al., 2002). Our experimental design and estimation methodology provide
a simple framework in which to test hypotheses of present bias and hyperbolic discounting.
Under hyperbolic discounting, estimated discount rates should be highest when t = 0, lower
when t = 7 and even lower when t = 35. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 follow the estimation
strategies of Table 2 columns (1) and (2), but estimate separate discount rates for each value
of t. The hyperbolic pattern of discounting is not observed and the three estimated values of
the discount rate do not dier signicantly (F2;96 = 1:85; 2:25; p = :16; :11, respectively).
Likewise, if individual discounting is quasi-hyperbolic, then estimated discount rates should
be higher when t = 0 and lower when t = 7 and t = 35. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 estimate
two separate discount rates: one for t = 0 and one for t 6= 0. The two estimated discount rates
are virtually identical (F1;96 = 0:34; 0:37; p = 0:56; 0:55, respectively). The calculated present
bias parameter, ^  = ^ t=0=^ t6=0, and its standard error (obtained via the delta method), indicate
an aggregate point estimate of  = 1 with a standard error of 0:000. Our data thus provide
evidence that is fully supportive of time consistency with no present bias.
This nding of no aggregate present bias is at striking odds with a body of experimental
results in both economics and psychology. Reconciling our ndings with others is an important
issue. A potential explanation is associated with our experimental methodology. First, exper-
imental evidence suggests that present bias may be conated with subjects' assessment of the
risk of receiving experimental payments (Halevy, 2008).22 Keren and Roelofsma (1995) and
Weber and Chapman (2005) nd that when applying increasing levels of risk to both present
and future payments, present bias decreases substantially. Our experimental methodology is
designed to eliminate dierential risk between sooner and later payments. Indeed, in Andreoni
and Sprenger (2009b) we show that when dierential payment risk is exogenously added back
into the decision environment, a hyperbolic pattern of discounting appears.
Though eliminating dierential payment reliability represents one possible explanation for
our ndings, many others exist. Principal among these explanations is that present bias is a
22Indeed, this is the motivating argument for experimental front-end delays. See, for example, Harrison et al.
(2002, 2005).
19Table 3: Hyperbolic Discounting and Present Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Annual Ratet=0 0.283 0.352 0.285 0.353
(0.060) (0.091) (0.060) (0.091)
Annual Ratet=7 0.329 0.401
(0.068) (0.088)
Annual Ratet=35 0.267 0.335
(0.069) (0.094)
Annual Ratet6=0 0.303 0.372
(0.067) (0.089)
Present Bias Parameter: ^  1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
^  0.920 0.921 0.921 0.922
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
^ !1 1.373 1.371
(0.276) (0.276)
^ !2 0.167 0.185
(1.624) (1.622)
^ !1 = ^ !2 1.356 1.355
(0.279) (0.278)
F- Statistic (H0 : Equality) 1.85 2.25 0.34 0.37
p-value 0.16 0.11 0.56 0.55
R2 0.4911 0.4910 0.4909 0.4908
N 4365 4365 4365 4365
Clusters 97 97 97 97
Notes: NLS Solution Function Estimators. Columns (1-2): Estimation of
discounting by t (F-test for Annual Ratet=0 = Annual Ratet=7 = Annual
Ratet=35). Columns (3-4): Present Bias in Discounting (F-test for Annual
Ratet=0 = Annual Ratet6=0). Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Annual discount rate calculated as (1=^ )365   1, ^  calculated as ^ t=0=^ t6=0;
standard errors calculated via the delta method.
visceral response only activated when sooner rewards are actually immediate. For example,
dynamic inconsistency is shown to manifest itself in immediate choices over healthy and un-
healthy snacks (Read and van Leeuwen, 1998), juice drinks (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein
and Cohen, 2007) and more immediate monetary rewards (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein
and Cohen, 2004).23 In order to equate transaction costs over sooner and later payments we
23In McClure et al. (2004), immediate monetary rewards were received via e-mail in the form of Amazon gift
20were unable to provide truly immediate rewards. Viewed in this light, our ndings represent
a potential bound on present bias. With delays of a few hours in between decision making
and reward receipt, present bias may be eectively eliminated. This suggests that the visceral
present-biased reaction to immediacy may pass quickly. It must also be recognized that our
ndings are only one data point on present bias among many and further research is necessary
before rm conclusions can be drawn.
4.2 Individual Results
Here we present estimates of discounting and curvature parameters at the individual level. Each
subject makes 45 CTB decisions in 9 (t;k) choice sets. In order to estimate time preferences
at the individual level, we take Vj to be a block diagonal matrix of choice set level clusters.24
For each subject, we estimate the parameters of g(), dened by (4). To limit the number
of estimated parameters, we restrict !1 = !2 = 1:356 as obtained in Table 2, column (2). The
parameters ^ , ^  are estimated by non-linear least squares with standard errors clustered on the
choice set level. For each individual, the annual discount rate is calculated based on ^  with
standard errors obtained via the delta method.
Time preference and curvature parameters are estimable for 89 of 97 subjects.25 The results
are broadly consistent with those estimated at the aggregate level. The median estimated
annual discount rate is 32.3%, close to the aggregate values obtained in Table 2. The median
estimated ^  is 0.975, suggesting that individual curvature, like aggregate curvature, is limited.26
Table 4 reports the median value and the 5th-95th percentile range for individual estimates
certicates directly after the experiment.
24Though one could assume a diagonal matrix and estimate preference parameters accordingly, we prefer this
specication. In each choice set there are 5 decisions with responses and therefore errors that are potentially
correlated.
25We do not study the 8 remaining subjects. Seven of these subjects had zero variance in their experimental
responses, taking the same number of sooner tokens in all 45 questions. The last remaining subject gave an
identical pattern of sooner token choices in every CTB: 4 tokens in the rst decision, 3 in the second, 2 in the
third, 1 in the fourth and 0 in the fth. Re-estimating aggregate parameter measures without these individuals
does not qualitatively change the results (available on request).
26As a robustness test we also estimate with !1 = !2 unrestricted. We are able to estimate for only 87
individuals and outlier estimates become more extreme. However, the median estimated discount rate is 32.1%
and the median estimated curvature is 0.975, similar to the values obtained in Table 4.
21of the annual discount rate, ^  and ^  along with the minimum and maximum values estimated.
For the majority of subjects, the employed estimation strategy works well, generating rea-
sonable parameter estimates. However, extreme observations do exist. Ranges for estimated
standard errors are also presented. Though median standard errors are low, there are some
individuals for whom parameters are imprecisely estimated. Estimation results for all subjects
are in Appendix Tables A2 - A5.
Table 4: Individual Discounting and Curvature Parameter Estimates
Median 5th 95th Min Max
Percentile Percentile
Annual Discount Rate .3234 -.1340 8.8873 -.9909 28.3541
Annual Discount RateSE .0841 0 4.7875 0 16.299
^  .9992 .9937 1.0004 .9908 1.013
^ SE .0002 0 .0022 0 .0172
^  .9749 .7359 .9996 .2786 .9998
^ SE .0085 0 .0627 0 .3387
Notes: NLS solution function estimators with restriction !1 = !2 = 1:356. Standard
errors clustered on the choice set level. Percentiles calculated from 89 individual-level
estimates.
4.2.1 Correlation Between CTB Parameter Estimates and DMPL Calculations
As an auxiliary test of the CTB design and estimation strategy, we compare individual dis-
counting and curvature parameter estimates to those calculated from standard binary MPL
and HL experiments, the components of the DMPL.
Three standard multiple price lists and two Holt-Laury risk price lists were administered to
all subjects. From the three price lists, we calculate daily discount factors following standard
practice27 and examine the average, d. From the two Holt-Laury risk price lists, we calculate
curvature parameters following standard practice28 and examine the average, a. In both MPLs
27Given a switching point, X, a later payment, Y , and a delay length, k, we calculate the daily discount factor
as d = (X=Y )1=k. This is equivalent to positing a linear utility function and zero background consumption.
28Given a switching probability pair, (p;1   p), and two Holt-Laury lotteries, A and B, we take the value a
22and HLs, individuals must exhibit a unique switching point to have a calculable discount factor
or curvature parameter.
Of the subjects for whom we estimate ^ , 87 of 89 have a calculable discount factor, d. The
median value implies an annual discount rate of 137 percent; in line with the very high observed
discount rates in MPL experiments. We can also test for present bias in the MPLs by comparing
the (t = 0;k = 35) MPL to the (t = 35;k = 35) MPL. Fifteen of 87 subjects (17%) are classied
as present-biased, (d(t=0;k=35) < d(t=35;k=35)), and the average present bias parameter is 0.9997,
(s.e. 0.0002). For comparison, using similar MPL methodology Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006);
Dohmen, Falk, Human and Sunde (2006) and Meier and Sprenger (2010), nd around 30-
35% of subjects to be present-biased and average present bias parameters substantially lower
than one. This further supports the notion that something associated with our experimental
methodology is limiting present bias in this setting. Of the subjects for whom we estimate
^ , 80 of 89 have a calculable curvature parameter, a. The median value is 0.5125 indicating
substantial concavity of the utility function, in line with prior ndings using HL risk measures.
that equates the expected utility of lottery A and lottery B. Following standard practice, we take the midpoint



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Figure 3 plots calculated and estimated parameters against each other. In Panel A the
calculated discount factor, d, is plotted against the estimated parameter, ^ , along with an
estimated regression line. Panel B is similar for a and ^ . The 45 degree line is also presented
to see how far the data lie from d = ^  and a = ^ .
Panel A of Figure 3 shows substantial observable correlation between MPL calculated and
CTB estimated discount factors ( = 0:458; p < 0:001). However, most of the data lies above
the 45 degree line indicating the the discount factor accounting for curvature is greater than the
discount factor assuming linear utility. This is consistent with standard bias arguments that,
under concave utility, discount factors calculated from price lists alone will be downwards-
biased. Additionally, we can examine the dierence, ^    d, as a measure of the bias. This bias
measure is negatively correlated with ^ , ( =  0:618; p < 0:001), such that subjects who are
closer to linear utility will have less biased MPL-calculated discount factors. This indicates
that, though biased, standard MPLs do yield measures of time preferences that correlate with
true patience and that the bias attenuates in a predictable way with utility function curvature.
Interestingly, in Panel B of Figure 3, Holt-Laury calculated curvature and CTB estimated
curvature show little observable correlation ( = 0:013; p = 0:911). This is surprising because
under CRRA expected utility the two elicitation methodologies ostensibly measure the same
utility construct. Not only is the level of curvature inconsistent between the two, but also the
individual correlation is remarkably small.29 This second nding suggests that the practice of
using Holt-Laury risk experiments to identify curvature in discounting may be problematic.
5 About Arbitrage
A relevant issue with monetary time preference experiments, as opposed to experiments with
primary consumption, is that, in theory, monetary payments should be subject to extra-lab
arbitrage opportunities. Subjects who can borrow (save) at an external interest rate inferior
29Additionally, Holt-Laury measured curvature does not correlate with the bias in discount factors discussed
above ( = 0:097; p = 0:401).
25(superior) to the lab-oered rate should arbitrage the lab by taking the later (sooner) experi-
mental payment. As such, measured discount rates in monetary experiments should collapse to
the interval of external borrowing and savings interest rates. In the CTB context, this arbitrage
argument also implies that subjects should never choose intermediate allocations unless they
are liquidity constrained.30 Furthermore, for `secondary' rewards, such as money, it is possible
that there could be less of a visceral temptation for immediate gratication than for `primary'
rewards that can be immediately consumed. As such, one might expect limited present bias in
monetary discounting experiments.
Contrary to the arbitrage argument, others have shown that experimentally elicited discount
rates are generally not measured in a tight interval near market rates (Coller and Williams,
1999; Harrison et al., 2002); they are not remarkably sensitive to the provision of external rate
information or to the elaboration of arbitrage opportunities (Coller and Williams, 1999); and
they are uncorrelated with credit constraints (Meier and Sprenger, 2010). In our CTB envi-
ronment, a sizeable proportion of chosen allocations are intermediate (30.4% of all responses,
average of 13.7 per subject) and the number of intermediate allocations is uncorrelated with
individual liquidity proxies such as credit-card holdership ( =  0:049; p = 0:641) and bank
account holdership ( =  0:096; p = 0:362).
Despite the fact that money is not a primary reward, monetary experiments do generate
evidence of present-biased preferences (Dohmen et al., 2006; Meier and Sprenger, 2010). Of
further interest is the nding by McClure et al. (2004, 2007) that discounting and present bias
over primary and monetary rewards have very similar neural images. As well, discount factors
elicited over primary and monetary rewards correlate highly at the individual level (Reuben,
Sapienza and Zingales, 2008). The fact that we nd signicant, but limited utility function
curvature is therefore consistent with the evidence of strict convexity of preferences in the
presence of arbitrage.
30If an arbitrage opportunity exists, the lab oered budget set is inferior to the extra-lab budget set everywhere
except one corner solution. This corner should be the chosen allocation. Liquidity constraints could yield
intermediate allocations if individuals are unable to move resources through time outside of the lab and desire
smooth consumption streams.
266 Conclusion
MPLs, and other experimental methods, frequently produce high estimates of annual discount
rates at odds with non-laboratory measures. A possible bias of MPLs is the imposition of linear
preferences, generating upwards-biased discount rate estimates if utility is actually concave.
Solutions to this bias to date have relied on Double Multiple Price List methodology: identifying
time preferences with MPLs and utility function curvature with Holt-Laury risk measures.
We propose a single simple instrument that can identify discounting and utility function
curvature at the aggregate and individual level, what we call Convex Time Budgets. Alloca-
tions in Convex Time Budgets are viewed as solutions to standard intertemporal optimization
problems with convex choice sets. Given assumptions on functional form, discounting and cur-
vature parameters are estimable. Additionally, tests of dynamic inconsistency such as present
bias and hyperbolic discounting are easily implemented.
In a computer-based experiment with 97 subjects, we show that CTBs precisely identify
discounting and curvature parameters at both the aggregate and individual level. Assum-
ing an exponentially-discounted CRRA utility function we nd an aggregate discount rate of
around 30% per year, substantially lower than most experimental estimates. Linear utility is re-
jected econometrically, though we nd less utility function curvature than obtained with DMPL
methodology. Additionally, we nd no evidence of present bias or hyperbolic discounting. In
fact, parameter estimates are remarkably supportive of time-consistent preferences.
When examining individual estimates, we nd that MPL-elicited discount rates, though
upwards biased, do correlate with CTB estimates. HL risk measures, however, are found to be
virtually uncorrelated with our estimated utility function curvature.
Our results raise a number of interesting questions. First, why did we nd no evidence of
present bias? We argue that this may be related to the steps we took to equate transaction costs
of sooner and later payments. Future work with CTBs and other aspects of our methodology are
necessary to understand how dynamic inconsistency appears in the lab. Second, why do we nd
substantial dierences between our estimates and those obtained with DMPL methodology? It
27is important to know whether these results are due to dierential stimuli (computer interface
vs. paper-and-pencil) or if they are robust to a common elicitation environment. Third, why is
the curvature estimated from CTBs virtually uncorrelated with HL risk measures? Exploring
the relationship between curvature in intertemporal settings and risk aversion in probabilistic
settings is an important next step, which we take up in Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b).
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31A Appendix
A.1 Welcome Text and Payment Explanation
Welcome and thank you for participating
Eligibility for this study: To be in this study, you need to meet these criteria. You must
have a campus mailing address of the form:
YOUR NAME
9450 GILMAN DR 92(MAILBOX NUMBER)
LA JOLLA CA 92092-(MAILBOX NUMBER)
You must live in:
 XXX College.
 XXX College AND have a student mail box number between 92XXXX and 92XXXX
 XXX College AND have a student mail box number between 92XXXX through 92XXXX.
Your mailbox must be a valid way for you to receive mail from now through the end of the
Spring Quarter. You must be willing to provide your name, campus mail box, email address,
and student PID. This information will only be seen by Professor Andreoni and his assistants.
After payment has been sent, this information will be destroyed. Your identity will not be a
part of any subsequent data analysis.
You must be willing to receive your payment for this study by check, written to you by
Professor James Andreoni, Director of the UCSD Economics Laboratory. The checks will be
drawn on the USE Credit Union on campus. This means that, if you wish, you can cash
your checks for free at the USE Credit Union any weekday from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm with
valid identication (drivers license, passport, etc.). The checks will be delivered to you at your
campus mailbox at a date to be determined by your decisions in this study, and by chance.
The latest you could receive payment is the last week of classes in the Spring Quarter.
If you do not meet all of these criteria, please inform us of this now.
32A.1.1 Payment Explanation
Earning Money
To begin, you will be given a $10 thank-you payment, just for participating in this study!
You will receive this thank-you payment in two equally sized payments of $5 each. The two $5
payments will come to you at two dierent times. These times will be determined in the way
described below.
In this study, you will make 47 choices over how to allocate money between two points in
time, one time is "earlier" and one is "later." Both the earlier and later times will vary across
decisions. This means you could be receiving payments as early as today, and as late as the
last week of classes in the Spring Quarter, or possibly two other dates in between. Once all 47
decisions have been made, we will randomly select one of the 47 decisions as the decision-that-
counts. We will use the decision-that-counts to determine your actual earnings. Note, since
all decisions are equally likely to be chosen, you should make each decision as if it will be the
decision-that-counts. When calculating your earnings from the decision-that-counts, we will
add to your earnings the two $5 thank you payments. Thus, you will always get paid at least
$5 at the chosen earlier time, and at least $5 at the chosen later time.
IMPORTANT: All payments you receive will arrive to your campus mailbox. That includes
payments that you receive today as well as payments you may receive at later dates. On
the scheduled day of payment, a check will be placed for delivery in campus mail services
by Professor Andreoni and his assistants. By special arrangement, campus mail services has
guaranteed delivery of 100% of your payments on the same day.
As a reminder to you, the day before you are scheduled to receive one of your payments, we
will send you an e-mail notifying you that the payment is coming.
On your table is a business card for Professor Andreoni with his contact information. Please
keep this in a safe place. If one of your payments is not received you should immediately contact
Professor Andreoni, and we will hand-deliver payment to you.
33Your Identity
In order to receive payment, we will need to collect the following pieces of information
from you: name, campus mail box, email address, and student PID. This information will
only be seen by Professor Andreoni and his assistants. After all payments have been sent, this
information will be destroyed. Your identity will not be a part of subsequent data analysis.
You have been assigned a participant number. This will be linked to your personal informa-
tion in order to complete payment. After all payments have been made, only the participant
number will remain in the data set.
On your desk are two envelopes: one for the sooner payment and one for the later payment.
Please take the time now to address them to yourself at your campus mail box.




































































































How It Works: 
 
In the following two sheets you are asked to choose between options: Option A or Option B.   
On each sheet you will make ten choices, one on each row. For each decision row you will have to choose 
either Option A or Option B. You make your decision by checking the box next to the option you prefer 
more. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other rows, and you may change your 
decisions and make them in any order. 
 
There are a total of 20 decisions on the following sheets. The sheets represent one of the 47 choices you 
make in the experiment. If the number 46 is drawn, these sheets will determine your payoffs. If the 
number 46 is drawn, a second number will also be drawn from 1 to 20. This will determine which 
decision (from 1 to 20) on the sheets is the decision-that-counts. The option you choose (either Option A 
or Option B) in the decision-that-counts will then be played. You will receive your payment from the 
decision–that-counts immediately. Your $5 sooner and later thank-you payments, however, will still be 
mailed as before. The sooner payment will be mailed today and the later payment will be mailed in 5 
weeks. 
 
Playing the Decision-That-Counts: 
 
Your payment in the decision-that-counts will be determined by throwing a 10 sided die. Now, please 
look at Decision 1 on the following sheet. Option A pays $10.39 if the throw of the ten sided die is 1, and 
it pays $8.31 if the throw is 2-10. Option B yields $20 if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays $0.52 if the 
throw is 2-10. The other Decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of 
the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be 
needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $10.39  or $20. 
 
Remember  that  each  decision  could  be  the  decision-that-counts!  It  is  in  your  interest  to  treat  each 
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43Table A1: Background Consumption, Parameter Esti-
mates and Goodness of Fit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
!1 = !2 Discount Rate ^  Root MSE R2
(s.e.) (s.e)
-26 .091 .226 6.46 .43
(.149) (.045)
-24 .094 .273 6.46 .431
(.149) (.042)
-22 .098 .321 6.45 .431
(.148) (.039)
-20 .103 .369 6.45 .432
(.147) (.036)
-18 .109 .418 6.44 .433
(.146) (.033)
-16 .117 .468 6.44 .434
(.144) (.03)
-14 .128 .519 6.43 .436
(.142) (.027)
-12 .142 .572 6.41 .438
(.14) (.024)
-10 .162 .626 6.4 .441
(.136) (.021)
-8 .19 .682 6.37 .446
(.131) (.018)
-6 .228 .741 6.33 .452
(.123) (.015)
-4 .275 .799 6.28 .462
(.113) (.012)
-2 .324 .852 6.2 .474
(.102) (.01)
0 .359 .897 6.13 .487
(.093) (.008)
2 .364 .932 6.11 .49
(.086) (.008)
4 .337 .96 6.26 .464
(.082) (.008)
6 .313 .976 6.72 .384
(.083) (.007)
Notes: NLS solution function estimators with restriction
!1 = !2 equal to column (1). Clustered standard errors in
parentheses. Annual discount rate calculated as (1=^ )365 1,
standard errors calculated via the delta method.
44Table A2: Individual Estimates 1



















































45Table A3: Individual Estimates 2

















































46Table A4: Individual Estimates 3














































47Table A5: Individual Estimates 4
Subject # Annual Rate ^ 
(S.E) (S.E)
73 .114 .999
(0) (0)
74 .114 1
(0) (0)
75 .147 .974
(.039) (.012)
76 -.428 .778
(.218) (.063)
77 .114 1
(0) (0)
78 0 .998
(0) (0)
79
80 .078 .975
(.043) (.01)
81 .813 .931
(.216) (.019)
82 .261 .619
(.098) (.026)
83 .114 1
(0) (0)
84
85 .005 .984
(.008) (.004)
86 .114 1
(0) (0)
87
88 1.372 .972
(.192) (.008)
89 .114 1
(0) (0)
90 2.563 .917
(.936) (.029)
91 .666 .957
(.066) (.007)
92 1.077 .979
(.079) (.005)
93
94 .114 1
(0) (0)
95 .114 1
(0) (0)
96 .426 .957
(.074) (.01)
97 .903 .998
(.018) (0)
48